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This  paper  studies  myopic  Bayesian  learning  processes  for  finite-player,  finite- 
strategy  normal  form  games.  Initially,  each  player  is presumed  to  know  his  own 
payoff  function  but  not  the  payoff  functions  of  the  other  players.  Assuming  that 
the  common  prior  distribution  of  payoff  functions  satisfies  independence  across 
players,  it  is proved  that  the  conditional  distributions  on  strategies  converge  to  a 
set of  Nash  equilibria  with  probability  one.  Under  a further  assumption  that  the 
prior  distributions  are  sufficiently  uniform,  convergence  to  a set of Nash  equilibria 
is proved  for  every  profile  of  payoff  functions,  that  is, every  normal  form  game. 
Q  1991 Academic  Press,  Inc. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In  a  Nash  equilibrium  of  a  normal  form  game,  each  player  must  cor- 
rectly  anticipate  the  strategies  played  by  the  others.  In  the  case  of  com- 
plete  information,  each  player  can  deduce  the  others’  strategies  by  com- 
puting  the  equilibrium,  provided  that  some  selection  convention  is 
adopted  when  there  are  multiple  equilibria.  However,  in  most  strategic 
situations  of  economic  interest,  individual  payoffs  are  private  informa- 
tion,  so deductive  reasoning  cannot  produce  the  knowledge  of  equilibrium 
strategies.  This  leads  to  the  question  of  whether  players  can  learn  the 
equilibrium  from  experience,  that  is,  from  repeated  plays  of  the  game. 
There  are  considerable  literatures  on  iterative  learning  procedures  in 
individual  decision  models  (e.g.,  Berry  and  Fristedt,  1985;  Easely  and 
Kiefer,  1986;  McLennan,  1987,  and  references  therein)  and  rational  ex- 
pectations  equilibrium  models  (e.g.,  Blume  et  ul.,  1982);  Feldman,  1987; 
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Marcet  and  Sargent,  1989,  and  references  therein).  By  comparison,  very 
little  is known  about  learning  in  games,  although  recent  papers  by  Fuden- 
berg  and  Kreps  (1988),  Kalai  and  Lehrer  (1990),  and  Milgrom  and  Roberts 
(1989)  indicate  increasing  interest  in  this  subject.  Fudenberg  and  Kreps 
study  learning  processes  for  iterated  extensive  form  games  in  which  play- 
ers  use a learning  process  somewhat  similar  to  fictitious  play  (e.g.,  Robin- 
son,  1951) except  that  players  occasionally  experiment  by  choosing  strat- 
egies  at  random.  They  show  that  if  the  learning  process  converges,  the 
limit  must  be  a  Nash  equilibrium  of  the  one-shot  extensive  form  game. 
Milgrom  and  Roberts  show  that  for  iterated  normal  form  games  a  large 
class of  strategy  adjustment  processes  result  in  strategy  sequences  which 
are  eventually  contained  in  the  set of  serially  undominated  strategies.  The 
Milgrom  and  Roberts  result  applies  to  the  Cournot  response  process, 
fictitious  play,  and  the  nonexperimental  strategies  generated  by  an  inter- 
esting  variation  of  a Fudenberg-Kreps  process.  Kalai  and  Lehrer  (1990) 
study  two-player  repeated  games  in which  the  players  use  Bayesian  infer- 
ence  to  learn  each  other’s  strategies.  They  show  that  if each  player’s  prior 
distribution  gives  positive  probability  to  the  true  strategy  of  the  other 
player,  then  the  two  strategies  converge  to  a  Nash  equilibrium  of  the 
repeated  game. 
The  present  paper  studies  a  class  of  Bayesian  learning  processes  for 
iterated  normal  form  games  with  a finite  number  of  players  and  a  finite 
number  of  pure  strategies.  The  main  result  is  that  if  the  common  prior 
beliefs  satisfy  a certain  uniformity  condition  then  for  every  normal  form 
game,  the  learning  process  converges  to  a  subset  of  the  set  of  one-shot 
Nash  equilibria.  As far  as I  am  aware,  this  is the  first  general  convergence 
result  for  normal  form  games. 
We  assume  that  each  player  knows  his own  payoff  function  but  not  the 
payoff  functions  of  the  other  players.  This  uncertainty  is summarized  by  a 
common  prior  distribution  over  payoff  functions  which  satisfies  indepen- 
dence  across  players.  At  the  initial  stage,  strategies  are  selected  according 
to  a Bayesian  Nash  equilibrium  determined  by  the  prior  distribution  over 
payoff  functions.  That  is,  each  possible  payoff  function  nP for  player  p  is 
associated  with  a  strategy  s,.  This  association,  together  with  the  prior 
distribution  pP over  rP,  determines  a probability  distribution  over  sP  . In  a 
Bayesian  Nash  equilibrium,  the  strategy  sP  associated  with  rP maximizes 
the  expected  payoff  determined  by  rrP and  the  anticipated  probability 
distribution  over  sq for  each  9 #  p.  After  an  initial  strategy  sy is observed, 
player  p  knows  that  7rq lies  in  the  set  of  payoff  functions  associated  with 
sq , and  updates  the  prior  pg  accordingly.  The  updated  beliefs  determine  a 
new  Bayesian  Nash  equilibrium,  and  so on.  At  each  step,  players  choose 
their  strategies  myopically,  seeking  to  maximize  their  current  expected 
payoff  without  regard  to  future  iterations.  The  resulting  stochastic  pro- 62  J.  S.  JORDAN 
cess of  strategy  n-tuples  is termed  a Bayesian  strategy  process  (BSP).  In 
particular,  a BSP describes  a joint  probability  distribution  of  games  (7~~)~ 
and  infinite  sequences  of  strategy  n-tuples  sI , sz , .  .  .  . The  focus  of  this 
paper  is the  relation  between  the  Nash  equilibria  of  the  game  (T,,)~ and  the 
sequence  of  probability  distributions  over  strategies  in  period  t  +  I  condi- 
tional  on  the  observed  histories  sI , .  .  .  , s,.  These  conditional  probabili- 
ties  represent  each  player  p’s  beliefs  about  the  strategies  to  be  chosen  in 
period  t  +  1 by  the  other  players,  so,  together  with  rr,,,  they  determine 
player  p’s  strategy  in period  t +  I.  Thus  player  p’s  strategy  in period  t  +  1 
is chosen  to  maximize  the  expectation  of  rp  against  the  conditional  proba- 
bility  distribution  over  other  players’  strategies.  Hence  the  desired  result 
is the  convergence  of  the  conditional  probability  distributions  to  the  set of 
Nash  equilibria  of  the  game  (Z-J,, . 
This  paper  provides  two  such  convergence  theorems.  Theorem  3.2, 
below,  asserts  that  convergence  occurs  with  probability  one  under  any 
Bayesian  strategy  process.  However,  this  leaves  open  the  possibility  that 
convergence  fails  to  occur  for  some  games  in  a  set  of  prior  probability 
zero.  Thus  Theorem  3.2  does  not  justify  the  interpretation  of  a BSP as a 
learning  process  for  general  normal  form  games.  General  convergence 
requires  a further  assumption  on  the  prior  beliefs  about  payoff  functions. 
Since  the  set of  strategy  n-tuples  is finite,  payoff  functions  lie  in  a finite- 
dimensional  Euclidean  space,  and  we  can  rescale  payoff  functions  to  he  in 
the  unit  ball  without  loss of  generality.  Since  the  unit  ball  is compact,  the 
uniform  distribution,  that  is,  normalized  Lebesgue  measure,  is well  de- 
fined.  Theorem  3.8,  more  transparently  stated  as Corollary  3.10,  states 
that  if  the  prior  beliefs  are  sufficiently  uniform  then  convergence  occurs 
for  every  game  (v&. 
Bayesian  strategy  processes  are  defined  formally  in  Section  2  below. 
Section  3  is  devoted  to  the  convergence  results,  and  some  concluding 
remarks  are given  in  Section  4.  Example  2.7  in  Section  2 describes  a BSP 
for  the  two-player,  two-strategy  case  with  uniform  priors.  This  example 
shows  that  for  certain  two-by-two  games  with  three  Nash  equilibria,  a 
BSP  can  generate  three  subsequences  of  conditional  probabilities  con- 
verging,  respectively,  to  each  of  the  three  Nash  equilibria.  Thus  Bayesian 
learning  does  not  appear  to  resolve  the  multiplicity  of  Nash  equilibria  in 
normal  form  games.  This  example  also  serves  to  emphasize  the  distinc- 
tion  between  the  learning  mechanism  represented  by  a  BSP and  mecha- 
nisms,  such  as the  tracing  procedure  (Harsanyi,  1975),  which  players  can 
use  to  select  a particular  Nash  equilibrium  strategy  if all players  know  all 
of  the  payoff  functions  (nJ,,.  A  BSP has  the  advantage  that  players  are 
not  required  to  know  each  others’  payoff  functions,  and  the  disadvantage 
that  multiple  Nash  equilibria  can  result  in  multiple  cluster  points  of  the 
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2.  BAYESIAN  STRATEGY  PROCESSES 
2.1.  DEFINITIONS.  There  are  II  players,  II  2  2,  indexed  by  the  sub- 
script  p.  For  each  1 I  p  5  n,  let  S,  be a finite  set,  and  let  S = II&lS,.  For 
each  p,  let  S-,  =  fly+  S,,  with  generic  element  s-,  =  (s, ,  .  ,  .  ,  speI, 
Sp+lr  .  .  .  ,  s,).  Each  player  p  is characterized  by  a  payoff  function  7~~: 
S -+  R.  The  space  of  possible  payoff  functions  for  each  player  is the  unit 
ball  in RS, that  is, B = {QT  E RS : (CsESrr(~)2)‘i2 d  I}.  Given  the  strategy  sets 
S,,  a  normal  form  game  is  completely  specified  by  an  n-tuple  of  payoff 
functions  (n,,),  E  B”,  so  let  G  =  B”  denote  the  space  of  all  games,  with 
generic  element  (5~~)~. 
A  probability  distribution  CT  on  S is a product  distribution  if  u  =  (r,  X 
.*.xu  ,I 3 where  each  v,,  is  the  marginal  distribution  on  S,>. That  is, 
a(s)  =  u,(s,)  .  .  . u,~(s,,) for  each  s E  S. A  Naslz  equilibrium  for  a game 
(nJp  E  G  is  a  product  distribution  c*  on  S such  that  for  each  p.  cz 
maximizes  x  ,,,,  ~p(s,~)~.,~,~~,~(.~,,  ,  s-,JaT,&)  over  the  set  of  probability 
measures  (T,, on S, , where  rJ.,(s,,  , S-J  = ‘ir,(.s, , .  .  .  , s,,~  I , s,’  , sI,+  I , .  .  .  , 
.sJ,  and  cr?,,  is  the  distribution  llyi.,,a$  on  S  -,,.  For  each  (7~~~)~~  E  G,  let 
N((n,,),,)  denote  the  set  of  Nash  equilibria. 
2.2.  Remarks.  It  is clear  that  the  normalization  of  payoff  functions  to 
the  unit  ball in RS involves  no  loss of generality.  Payoff  functions  could  be 
normalized  further  to  the  unit  sphere,  but  the  convexity  of  the  unit  ball  is 
more  convenient  for  the  proof  of  Theorem  3.8  below. 
In  order  to  define  the  process  which  generates  successive  strategies  and 
expectations,  we  will  first  introduce  some  notation  for  conditional  proba- 
bilities.  Fortunately,  the  usual  measure  theoretic  subtleties  involved  with 
conditional  probability  are  avoided  here  because  of  the  finiteness  of  the 
strategy  sets.  Thus,  any  finite  sequence  of  strategy  n-tuples  either  has 
positive  probability  or lies outside  the  support  of  the  relevant  distribution. 
2.3.  DEFINITIONS.  Suppose  that  X  and  Y are  metric  spaces  and  Z  is 
the  product  space,  Z  = X  x  Y. Let  cp  be a Bore1  probability  measure  on  Z. 
The  support  of  cp, written  “supp  cp,  ”  is defined  to  be  the  smallest  closed 
subset  C  C  Z  with  p(C)  =  1.  The  support  of  the  marginal  probability 
distribution  on  X  is  the  smallest  closed  subset  C  C  X  such  that 
cp(C x  Y) =  1. If  x E X,  the  statement  “x  E supp  cp” will  be understood  to 
mean  that  x  is in  the  support  of  the  marginal  distribution  on  X.  If  E is a 
Bore1  subset  of  X,  cp(E x  Y) will  often  be  written  simply  p(E),  and  if x  E 
X,  q(x)  denotes  cp({x}),  that  is,  cp({x}  x  Y). 
For  each  I  5  t  <  cc, let  S’  =  I&,  S,  with  generic  element  s’  = 
(Sir  .  .  .  ,  s,),  and  let  S”  =  II,“=,  S.  We  topologize  each  S’ and  S”  as 
products  of  the  discrete  space  S.  Let  G have  the  Euclidean  topology,  and 
let  cp  be  a Bore1  probability  measure  on  G  x  S”.  For  each  p,  I,  each  s’ E 64  J.  S.  JORDAN 
supp  cp, and  each  s,  E  S,,  let  ‘pp(spls’) be  the  probability  that  sp,+,  =  sp 
conditional  on s’, that  is, ‘pp(spls’) = cp(s’, s,)lcp(s’).  For  each  s-,,  E S-,  , let 
cp-,(s-,ls’)  be  the  probability  that  s-~,+~ =  sep conditional  on  s’,  that  is, 
~p-&~~s’)  =  cp(s’, s-J(p(s’).  If  t  =  0,  we  adopt  the  convention  that 
(s’,  SJ  =  sp, (s’,  s-&  =  smp, and  cpp(sp~s’)  (resp.  ~-,,(s~~~s’)) represents  the 
unconditional  probability  that  spl = s,, (resp.  smpl = s-J.  Finally,  for  each 
t  2  1, and  each  s’ E  supp  cp, &Is’)  denotes  the  probability  that  s,+,  =  s 
conditional  on  s’,  with  the  analogous  convention  for  t  =  0. 
2.4.  Bayesian  strategy  processes.  For  each  p,  let  pp  be a Bore1 proba- 
bility  distribution  on  B,  and  let  p  denote  the  product  measure,  p  = pl  x 
.  .  .  X  p,,  on  G.  A Bore1  probability  measure  cp on  G  X  S”  is a Bayesian 
strategy  process  for  p  if 
(i)  the  marginal  distribution  on  G agrees  with  I-L; 
(ii)  for  each  p,  each  t  2  0,  and  each  (7rp; s’,  sp) E  supp  cp, sp maxi- 
mizes  x,-,mJ*,  s~p)(p-p(s-p~sf) on  S,;  and 
(iii)  for  each  s’ E  supp  cp, cp(-Is’) is a  product  distribution,  that  is, 
qJ(-Is’) =  cpl(.lS’) x  . .  .  x  (pp(‘lS’) x  .  * .  x  cp,(-Is’). 
2.5  Remarks.  The  essential  property  of  a  BSP  is  the  maximization 
condition  2.4  (ii),  which  states  that  in  period  t  +  1, sp is chosen  to  maxi- 
mize  player  p’s  expected  payoff  conditioned  on  the  observed  strategy  n- 
tuples  sl , .  .  .  , sl.  Condition  2.4  (ii) does  not  completely  rule  out  corre- 
lated  strategies  because  of  the  possibility  that,  if  different  players  each 
have  several  maximal  strategies,  they  could  correlate  their  choices  among 
these  strategies  and  still  satisfy  2.4  (ii).  Condition  2.4  (iii)  rules  out  this 
possibility  by  requiring  the  strategies  of  different  players  to  be  condition- 
ally  independent  each  period.  Condition  2.4  (iii)  does  not  quite  ensure  the 
conditional  independence  of  s,  and  7~~  for  4  #  p,  but  we  will  not  need  a 
stronger  independence  condition.  We  will  observe  in  Section  3.7,  below, 
that  if  each  pp  is absolutely  continuous  with  respect  to  Lebesgue  measure 
on B,  so that  multiple  maxima  occur  only  for  a null  set of  payoff  functions, 
then  2.4  (iii)  is implied  by  2.4  (i)  and  (ii). 
Although  the  successive  updating  of  the  prior  probability  distribution  k 
is  not  explicitly  specified  in  the  above  definition,  it  can  be  used  to  con- 
struct  a BSP as a sequence  of  Bayesian  Nash  equilibria.  Given  CL,  with  the 
players’  payoff  functions  interpreted  as their  characteristics,  the  assump- 
tionthatp=pI  x  .*a  x  p,,  immediately  implies  the  hypothesis  of  the 
Existence  Theorem  of  Milgrom  and  Weber  (1985,  p.  626).  Hence,  for  each 
p,  there  is a Bore1  measurable  functionf,:  B  x  S, -+ R  such  that  for  each 
np  E B,fp(~p,  *) is a probability  distribution  on  S,  which  maximizes 
c  vp(sp)  I,,@  [  2  ‘TTpbp  >  s-P)f-P(~-P  3  s-p$4--p 
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on  the  set  of  all proability  distributions  cr,, on  S,,  where&Jr-,,  s-&  = 
fI,,,f,(7r,,  sq) and  pep  = IIqf+,  . Then  p  and  the  functions&  determine  a 
distribution  cpt  , on  G  x  S,  so for  each  s E  supp  cp’  , we  have  a conditional 
distribution  p’(s)  on  G.  By  the  construction  of  (o’, p’(s)  =  pi(s)  X  * .  *  x 
p:(s),  so the  hypothesis  of  the  Milgrom  and  Weber  Existence  Theorem  is 
again  satisfied.  Hence,  there  is a Bayesian  Nash  equilibrium  for  the  up- 
dated  prior  distribution  p’(s),  for  every  s  E  supp  cp’. Proceeding  itera- 
tively  in  this  fashion,  we  can  obtain  for  every  t  <  m a distribution  ‘p’ on 
G  x  S’  which  satifies  conditions  2.4  (i)-(iii)  by  construction.  By  the 
Kolmogoroff  Extension  Theorem,  these  distributions  define  a distribution 
(o on  G  x  S”  which  is  a  BSP for  p.  Thus,  we  can  state  the  following 
proposition  as a direct  implication  of  the  Milgrom  and  Weber  Existence 
Theorem.  I 
2.6.  PROPOSITION.  For  each  p,  let  p,,  be  a Bore1  probability  distribu- 
tion  on  B,  and  let  p  =  pLl x  * .  .  X  p,, . Then  there  exists  a BSP for  p. 
2.7.  EXAMPLE.  The  most  transparent  example  is the  2  x  2 case  with 
uniform  priors.  Let  player  1 be the  row  player,  let  player  2 be  the  column 
player,  and  let  St  =  {T,  B},  &  =  {L,  R}.  Then  each  player  p’s  payoff 
function  is a 2  x  2 matrix  with  the  entries  nJT,  L),  7~p(T, R),  nJB,  L), 
n,(B,  R).  However,  it  will  be convenient  to  employ  the  following  normal- 
ization  which  reduces  each  player  p’s  space  of  possible  payoff  functions 
to  the  unit  circle  in  R*.  To  motivate  this  normalization,  suppose  that 
player  1 anticipates  that  player  2 will  play  L  with  probability  cp#).  Then 
player  l’s  optimal  strategy  is T,  B,  or  both,  as the  quantity 
‘P~VJ[~IU-,  L)  -  n,(B,  L)l  +  (1  -  +4L))[m(T,  R)  -  q(B,  R)] 
is positive,  negative,  or  zero,  respectively.  Therefore  we  can  subtract  the 
second  row  of  player  l’s  payoff  matrix  from  each  row,  so that  the  top  row 
is now  (r,(T,  L)  -  m,(B,  L),  r,(T,  R)  -  q(B,  R))  and  the  bottom  row  is (0, 
0).  Applying  the  same  normalization  to  the  columns  of  player  2’s  payoff 
matrix  reduces  the  payoff  bimatrix  to  the  form 
L  R 
T  a,  (Y  b,  0 
B  0,  p  0,  0 
’  Strictly  speaking,  Milgrom  and  Weber  (1985) define  equilibrium  in  terms  ofjoint  distribu- 
tions  on  B  x  S,,  and  our  functionsf,  are  the  associated  conditional  distributions  on  S,,  given 
TV.  A  more  recent  and  more  general  existence  theorem  due  to  Balder  (1987)  is  stated  in 
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If  we ignore  the  measure  zero  possibility  that  a  = b  = 0,  that  is, rrt(T,  L)  = 
r,(B,  L)  and  rr,(T,  R)  =  r,(B,  R),  then  we  can  further  normalize  (a,  b)  to 
the  unit  circle  without  affecting  player  l’s  response  to  any  mixed  strategy 
played  by  player  2. Thus  we  can assume  that  u’  +  b2 =  1, and  for  player  2, 
that  CY*  + p*  =  I.  Under  this  normalization,  each  player’s  payoff  function 
is  a  point  on  the  unit  circle,  and  each  2  x  2  game  is  a  point  on  the 
torus  (we  will  continue  to  exclude  the  degenerate  cases u =  b = 0 and  CY  = 
p  =  0). 
One  immediate  benefit  of  this  normalization  is a simple  graphical  repre- 
sentation  of  the  Nash  equilibrium  correspondence  for  2  x  2 games.  Figure 
1 pictures  the  Nash  equilibrium  correspondence  when  points  on  the  unit 
circle  are  measured  in  radians,  with  (1,  0)  =  0  =  27~  and  (0,  I)  =  7ri2. 
Thus,  the  game  (-7r/4,  -7r/4)  in  the  lower  left  corner  of  Fig.  I  is  the 
bimatrix  game 
L  R 
T  w?,  r/v?  -l/v?!,  0 
B  0,  -1lti  0,  0 
Since  -7r/4  =  77r/4,  the  two  sides  of  the  figure  are  identified,  and  the  top 
and  bottom  of  the  figure  are  identified,  so  Fig.  1 is  the  usual  square 
depiction  of  the  torus  (e.g.,  Guillemin  and  Pollak,  1974,  Fig.  l-10,  p.  17). 
In  the  white  areas,  the  Nash  equilibrium  is a unique  pure  strategy  equilib- 
rium,  so  each  white  area  is  labeled  with  the  respective  equilibrium  pure 
strategies.  The  gray  areas  are  intersections  of  white  areas.  Therefore, 
each  game  in  the  gray  sqaure  [r/2,  ~1  x  [r/2,  QT],  in  the  center  of  Fig.  I, 
for  example,  has the  two  pure  strategy  equilibria  (T, R)  and  (B,  L).  Games 
in  the  interior,  (7r/2,  7~) x  (n/2,  7~), also  have  a  single  mixed  strategy 
equilibrium.  These  games  behave  as  “battle-of-the-sexes”  games.  Note 
that  because  of  the  identifications  along  the  sides  and  the  top  and  bottom 
of  Fig.  1, the  four  small  gray  squares  in  the  corners  adjoin  the  form  the 
square  [3rr/2,  01  x  [3~/2,  O] on  the  torus.  Each  game  in  the  interior  of  a 
black  area  has  a  mixed  strategy  equilibrium  as its  unique  Nash  equilib- 
rium.  The  games  on  the  boundaries  of  regions  are  “singular  games” 
which  typically  have  a continuum  of  Nash  equilibria. 
The  first  element  of  a  Bayesian  strategy  process  is a  prior  probability 
distribution  over  each  player’s  space  of  possible  payoff  functions,  in  this 
case,  over  the  unit  circle  for  each  player.  A  natural  choice  is the  uniform 
distribution  for  each  player.  For  this  prior  distribution,  we  will  study  a 
Bayesian  strategy  process  along  the  two-period  history  ((T,  R),  (B,  L)). 
More  precisely,  we  will  compute  the  first-period  expectations  cp(.) and 
second-period  expectations  cp(*IT, L),  which  are  uniquely  determined,  and 
show  that  there  are  three  possible  choices  for  the  third-period  expecta- BAYESIAN  LEARNING  67 
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tions  cp(.I(T, L),  (B, R)).  First,  let  ‘p2 denote  the  initial  probability  distribu- 
tion  on  S2 =  {L,  R} facing  player  1. That  is,  cpz(L) is the  probability  that 
player  2 will  play  L in the  first  period.  Then  player  1 will  play  Tin  period  I 
if  player  l’s  payoff  function,  represented  by  (a,  b),  satisfies  ap2(L) + 
b(l  -  cp~(L))  >  0. That  is, the  set of  player  1 “types”  that  play  Tin period 
1 is  the  set  5,  =  {(a, b):ucp,(L) +  6(1  -  q,(L))  >  O}.  The  set  {(a,  h): 
u&L)  +  6(1  -  &L))  =  0}  has  prior  probability  zero  and  thus  can  be 
ignored.  Hence,  for  any  expectation  (p2(L),  the  probability  that  player  I 
will  play  T, which  is  simply  the  prior  probability  of  the  set  CY,, equals  f. 
Since  this  reasoning  applies  to  both  players  symmetrically,  the  unique 
first-period  Bayesian  Nash  equilibria  are  p,(T) =  cp,(B)  =  4 and  q(L)  = 
cp~(R)  =  $. Figure  2 illustrates  this  reasoning  for  player  I.  The  circle  is the 
space  of  payoff  functions  for  player  I,  and  the  unit  simplex  represents  the 
possible  first-period  expectations  ((p2(L).  q(R)).  The  semicircle  above  the 
line  perpendicular  to  the  expectation  vector  is  the  set  3,  of  player  I 
“types”  that  play  T in  period  I. 
NOW  suppose  that  the  strategies  (T, R) are  played  in  period  1.  This 
reveals  that  player  l’s  payoff  function  lies  on  the  upper  semicircle  de- 
picted  in  Fig.  3,  and  that  player  2’s  payoff  function  lies  on  the  lower 
semicircle  depicted  in  Fig.  4.  To  solve  for  the  Bayesian  Nash  equilibrium 
conditional  expectations  cp(-j(T,  R)), let  x  =  p,(TI(T, R)), the  probability 
that  player  1 plays  T in  period  2,  and  let  y  =  (p2(LI(T,  R)). Given y, x is 
simply  ~l.r({(a,  6)  E 91:  uy  +  b(1  -  y)  >  O})IpcLI(9r), where  pr  denotes  the 68  J.  S.  JORDAN 
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uniform  distribution  on  the  unit  circle.  Thus  x  is  simply  the  relative  arc 
length  given  by  the  formula 
where  O(y) is the  angle  between  the  expectations  vectors  ($, t) and  (y,  1 - 
y),  measured  in  radians.  This  is depicted  in  Fig.  3.  Figure  4 is the  analo- 
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gous  diagram  for  player  2, and  the  analogous  formula  for  y as a function  of 
x is 
1 -  y  =  (7r -  /0(x)l)lr.  (2) 
Equations  (1)  and  (2) have  a unique  solution: 
X*  =  0.82,  y*  =  0.18,  (3) 
so the  unique  second-period  Bayesian  Nash  equilibrium  expectations  are 
cpdTI(T,  RI)  = x*  and  (pALI(T,  RN  =  Y*. 
Now  suppose  that  the  strategies  (B,  L)  are  played  in  period  2.  This 
reveals  that  player  l’s  payoff  function  lies  in  the  arc  between  the  line 
perpendicular  to  the  expectation  vector  (t,  4) and  the  line  perpendicular  to 
the  expectation  vector  (y*,  1 -  y*),  and  the  analogous  inference  can  be 
drawn  concerning  player  2.  Algebraically,  (a,  b)  and  (a,  p)  have  been 
revealed  to  satisfy 
(Qa  +  (&b  >  0, 
y*a  +  (1  -  y*)b  <  0; 
w  +  ti)p  <  0; 
(4) 
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Since  y*  <  B and  x*  >  4, (4)  implies 
a  >  0,  b<  0;  a  >  0,  p  <  0.  (5) 
If  follows  from  (5),  or  from  Fig.  1, that  (T,  L)  and  (B,  R)  are  pure  strategy 
Nash  equilibria  for  every  game  (7~~~  7~2)  such  that  ((7~i, ~TZ),  (T,  R),  (B,  L)) 
E  supp  cp. It  also follows  that  there  is a mixed  strategy  Nash  equilibrium, 
but  the  equlibrium  mixed  strategies  are  not  yet  revealed. 
Therefore,  in  period  3,  there  are  three  possible  Bayesian  Nash  equilib- 
rium  expectations: 
~lUI(~~  RI,  (B,  L))  =  (pdLI(T,  lo,  (B,  L))  =  1; 
Plul(~7  m,  (B,  L))  =  ~2u#-,  lo,  (B,  L))  =  0;  (6) 
dTI(T,  RI,  (B,  L))  =  0.61,  (pdLl(T,  RI,  (B,  ~5))  I-  0.39. 
The  first  two  are  “pure  strategy”  Bayesian  Nash  equilibria  which  corre- 
spond  to  the  pure  strategy  Nash  equilibria  and  reveal  no  further  informa- 
tion  about  each  player’s  payoff  function.  The  third  is  a  “quasi-mixed” 
Bayesian  Nash  equilibrium  which  further  partitions  the  two  arcs  revealed 
by  the  history  ((T,  R),  (B,  L)).  This  multiplicity  of  Bayesian  Nash  equilib- 
ria  continues  for  all  future  periods.  If  the  “quasi-mixed”  equilibrium  is 
selected  infinitely  often,  it will  converge  to  the  mixed  strategy  Nash  equi- 
librium  determined  by  the  true  payoff  functions  (a,  b),  (a,  p). 
Figure  5 depicts  the  possible  limits  of  expectations  for  any  Bayesian 
strategy  process  with  uniform  priors.  The  white,  black,  and  gray  regions 
have  the  same  interpretation  as in  Fig.  1. Where  the  Nash  equilibrium  is 
unique,  it is also  the  unique  limit  of  any  Bayesian  Nash  equilibrium  expec- 
tations  sequence.  Where  there  are  multiple  Nash  equilibria,  a comparison 
of  Figs.  1 and  5  indicates  that  for  some  games  the  expectations  limit  is 
unique,  and  for  some  games  there  can  be  multiple  cluster  points.  The 
games  discussed  above,  for  which  (T, R)  and  (B, L)  are  played  in periods  1 
and  2,  respectively,  constitute  the  large  gray  square  =[-~14,  -v/15]  x 
[477r/30,  77r/4].  The  contiguous  smaller  gray  square  is associated  with  the 
history  (V,  RI,  CT, R),  (B,  L),  .  .  .),  and  so  on,  with  each  succesively 
smaller  square  associated  with  an  additional  play  of  (T,  R)  followed  by  a 
switch  to  (B,  L).  As  the  picture  suggests,  the  gray  squares  decrease  expo- 
nentially  to  the  point  (0,  3rr/2).  More  generally,  all four  cascades  of  gray 
squares  correspond  to  successively  longer  runs  of  a  given  strategy  pair 
followed  by  a  simultaneous  switch  to  the  opposite  strategies  by  both 
players. 
2.8.  Strategic  issues.  The  above  example  also  illustrates  the  assump- 
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the  current  expected  payoff  given  the  current  Bayesian  Nash  equilibrium 
expectations.  The  choice  of  s,, subsequently  reveals  information  about 
player  p’s  payoff  function  to  the  other  players,  leading  to  next  periods’ 
Bayesian  Nash  equilibrium,  and  so  on.  In  some  cases  it  is possible  for 
player  p  to  choose  sP  in  a more  sophisticated  fashion  so as to  manipulate 
the  expectations  of  the  other  players.  The  assumption  of  myopic  behavior 
precludes  any  consideration  of  the  strategic  aspects  of  information  revela- 
tion.  Of  course,  loosely  speaking,  the  potential  gains  from  more  sophisti- 
cated  strategy  choices  diminish  as the  number  of  players  increases.  In  the 
ideal  case  in  which  each  player  in  the  above  model  represents  a contin- 
uum  of  players  of  the  same  type,  individual  players  have  no  incentive  to 
deviate  from  myopic  behavior.  This  assumption  is  used  by  Feldman 
(1987)  in  proving  the  convergence  of  a myopic  Bayesian  learning  process 
for  firms  in  a  market  equilibrium  model  (see  also  Townsend,  1978). 
If,  in  the  small  numbers  case,  players  anticipate  future  iterations  when 
they  select  current  strategies,  repeated  game  equilibria  other  than  the 
one-shot  Nash  equilibria  may  be  more  appropriate  limits  of  learning  pro- 
cesses.  We  have  not  attempted  to  extend  the  above  model  to  the  more 
general  problem  of  learning  repeated  game  equilibria,  but  some  positive 
results  have  been  obtained  recently  by  Kalai  and  Lehrer  (1990)  for  Bay- 
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3.  CONVERGENCETO  NASH  EQUILIBRIUM 
This  section  contains  two  results  on  the  convergence  of  the  conditional 
expectations  a(*(#)  to  Nash  equilibrium.  Example  2.7  indicates  that  the 
sequence  cp(*js’) for  a given  game  (7rJp may  have  multiple  cluster  points. 
However,  Theorem  3.2,  below,  asserts  that  with  cp-probability  one,  every 
cluster  point  is  a Nash  equilibrium.  The  intuition  behind  Theorem  3.2  is 
fairly  straightforward.  Let  ((TJ,,  , 9)  E  supp  cp and  suppose  that  some 
product  distribution  CF  is a cluster  point  of  the  sequence  cp(.ls’). The  only 
way  u  can  fail  to  be a Nash  equilibrium  for  (r&,  is if,  for  some  p,  there  is 
some  strategy  s;  which  does  not  maximize  the  expectation  of  v,,  against 
u-,,  , but  o&p)  > 0.  However,  since  cp(=ls’)  is near  o  infinitely  often,  there 
are  infinitely  many  periods  t  such  that  cp(*Js’)  is near  o mp, and  sp,+i =  s,; 
with  probability  o&;Js’),  which  is near  crJsp)  >  0.  A  player  p  with  the 
payoff  function  rrp  would  never  play  s,,  -  in  these  circumstances,  so  the 
likelihood  that  7rp is associated  with  sf is reduced  by  a fraction  near  o,,(sJ 
in each  such  period  t. Thus  the  probability  of  disequilibrium  situations  can 
be  driven  to  zero. 
3.1.  DEFINITIONS.  If  I >  T, s’ E S’, and  sT E ST, we  will  write  s’ > sT if 
s7 consists  of  the  first  r terms  of  s’,  that  is s:  = s:, for  all u I  r.  A sequence 
{s’k}~=i is said  to  be  increasing  if th -+ ~0, and  for  each  k,  tk+  I >  th and  s’k+i 
>  9.Q. If  some  sm E S”  has  been  quantified,  we  will  sometimes  refer  to  s’ 
without  explicitly  writing  s’ <  sD, where  there  is  no  risk  of  confusion. 
Given  probability  distributions  (T and  (T’  on  S,  define  11~ -  (~‘11 = 
max{lu(s)  -  o’(s)1  : s E S}.  Given  u  and  a set A of  probability  distributions 
on  S, define  [Iu--  AlI  =  inf{llo  -  o’lj  :u’  E A}. 
3.2.  THEOREM.  Let  (o be  a BSP.  Then  (p{((mJp,  .F)  : lim,+,  J(cp(.ls’) - 
NCqJp)ll  =  01 =  1. 
Proof.  Let  D  =  {((r,),  , sffi) E  supp  cp  : II~(.ls’)  -  N((7rJ,)(l  4  O}. We 
will  show  that  D  is  a  countable  union  of  sets  of  probability  zero.  Let 
((T&l  ? sm) E  D.  Since  the  set  of  probability  measures  on  S is compact 
there  is  an  increasing  sequence  {s’~}~=, ,  with  s’h  <  sZ  for  each  k  and 
q(.ls’n)  +  u*  for  some  u*  @ N((rr,),).  Since  (o is a BSP,  2.4  (iii)  implies 
that  V*  = l&,up*,  where  ui  is the  marginal  distribution  of  u*  on  S, , for 
eachp.  Since  u*  $Z  N((?r,,),),  there  is some  4,  some  s,’ , s,  E S,,  and  some 
E >  0  such  that 
and 
(p&p)  >  E;  (7) 
F  h-&qf  7 S-J  -  7rq(si,  s-q)]p-q(S-,IS’k)  >  E,  (8) 
Y 
for  all  k sufficiently  large. BAYESIAN  LEARNING  73 
Accordingly,  fix  si,  s;  E  S,,  let  0  <  E <  1,  and  let  u”  be  a  product 
distribution  on  S with  ui(s;)  >  E. Let  6  >  0  such  that  for  any  product 
distribution  (T on  S which  satisfies  11  u  -  u”ll  <  6,  we  have  U&S;)  >  E. Let 
U(a”,  6)  = {o  : c  is a product  distribution  and  Ilo  -  (~~11  <  S}. Let  P,,(aO, 6) 
=  {7rq E  B:  ~s-,[7r,(s~,  s-J  -  n&i,  s-,)]u-J-J  >  0  for  every  (+ E 
N(aO,  6)).  Finally,  define  Do  =  {((T,,)~,  5)  E  supp  cp  : rrq E P,((rO,  6) and 
cp(.ls’) E  U(rrO, 6) for  infinitely  many  t}.  It  is apparent  from  (7) and  (8) that 
D  is the  union  of  sets  Do over  all  1 5  9  5  n,  all  si,  s;  E  S,,  countably 
many  values  of  E and  6, and  a countable  dense  subset  of  product  distribu- 
tions  o”  on  S. Thus  it  suffices  to  prove  that  (~(00)  =  0. 
For  each  sr  E  supp  (o and  each  t  2  1, let  c,(C)  =  #{T  %  t : cp(.ls’)  E 
U(a”,  6)).  Then  Do  =  {((7r,Jp,  s=)  E  supp  cp: 7~~  E  P,(vO,  6)  and  c,(sa)  -+ 
M}.  For  each  t  2  1 and  each  integer  k  r  1, let 
0:  =  {((TV&,  s”‘) E  supp  cp  : rrq E P,(cTO, 6) and  cI(ss)  =  k for  some  t}. 
Then  Dz+,  C  0:  for  each  k,  and  Do  =  n,Di.  We  will  obtain  an  upper 
bound  on  p(Df).  Since  cp is a BSP,  property  2.4  (ii)  implies  that  if  ((n,,&, 
sffi) E  supp  (o with  gq  E P,(c”,  6)  and  cp(.ls’) E  U(a”,  6) then  ++I  #  s;  . 
However,  if cp(*ls’) E  U(riO, 6) then  (o&s;(s’)  >  E. Therefore  cp{((nJ,,  s’) E 
supp  (a: 7~~  E  P,(o”,  s)  and  cp(.(s’) E  U(a”,  S)} <  (1  -  E)(P{((~J~,  s’)  E 
supp  cp  : $0(./s’) E  U((T O, 6))  d  (I  -  E). Proceeding  iteratively,  we  obtain 
cp(Df)  <  (1  -  E)~. Hence  (~(0~) =  0.  n 
3.3.  Remarks.  Theorem  3.2  states  that  convergence  to  Nash  equilib- 
rium  fails  only  on  a  set  of  cp-probability  zero.  However,  the  theorem 
allows  the  possibility  that  for  some  games  (TJ,,  E  supp  p  and  some 
histories  s”  with  ((nJp,  sz) E  supp  cp, there  is a  subsequence  of  expecta- 
tions  (D(*[s’~)  which  is bounded  away  from  N((rJ,J.  Example  3.11,  below, 
explicitly  demonstrates  this  possibility.  Thus  Theorem  3.2  ensures  con- 
vergence  only  to  the  extent  that  the  prior  distribution  Al. is  interpreted 
literally  as the  distribution  from  which  the  game  is drawn.  If  p  is misspeci- 
fied,  the  “true”  probability  of  nonconvergence  may  be  positive.  In  any 
case,  a much  stronger  convergence  result  is needed  to justify  the  interpre- 
tation  of  Bayesian  strategy  processes  as  learning  processes  for  general 
normal  form  games. 
A general  convergence  result  is stated  in Theorem  3.8,  below,  under  the 
assumption  that  each  pp  is very  similar  to  the  uniform  distribution  on  B. 
This  property  is defined  formally  below. 
3.4.  DEFINITIONS,  Let  m denote  Lebesgue  measure  on B.  For  1 5  p  I 
n,  the  notation  pp  e  m states  that  pp  is absolutely  continuous  with  respect 
to  Lebesgue  measure.  For  each  p,  we  will  write  pp  -  m  if  there  is  some 
number  (Y >  0  such  that  for  every  Bore1  set  E  C  B,  am(E)  2  pp(E)  2 
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3.5.  Remarks.  If  pp  -  m,  then  pp  and  m  are  mutually  absolutely 
continuous.  Moreover,  if g,  is a density  function  for  pup  with  respect  to  m, 
then  for  some  (Y  >  0,  (Y  >  g,,(7~p) >  I/CX  for  almost  every  mp E B.  We  will 
discuss  the  role  of  this  property  in  Section  3.7,  below. 
The  proof  of  Theorem  3.8  will  use a characterization  of  Bayesian  strat- 
egy processes  which  relies  only  on  the  absolute  continuity  of  each  p,, with 
respect  to  Lebesgue  measure  on  B.  Recall  that  in  period  t  +  1, given  an 
observed  history  9,  playerp  faces  the  distribution  ‘p-J.ls’)  over  his oppo- 
nents’  strategies.  Except  for  a set of  payoff  functions  rp  having  Lebesgue 
measure  zero,  playerp  has a unique  maximal  response  to  (p-J./s’).  There- 
fore,  if  pp  <  m for  each  p,  one  can  express  the  probability  of  each  history 
s’ as the  p-measure  of  games  (r&,  such  that,  for  each  T <  t,  each  .sprfl 
uniquely  maximizes  the  expectation  of  7rp against  ~T-~(./.Y~).  In  particular, 
mixed  strategies  can  be  ignored.  This  characterization  is  stated  in  the 
following  proposition. 
3.6.  PROPOSITION.  Suppose  that  t+  e  m for  each  p  and  that  cp is 
a BSP for  p.  Let  s’ E  supp  cp with  t  2  I,  and  for  each  p,  dejne  C,(s’)  = 
{TV E  B : for  each  r  <  t,  s;,,  , maximizes  Cs-prJ*,  s-p)(p-p(s-plsT)  on  S,, 
where  s7 <  s’},  and  dejine  C$st)  =  {rD  E  B:for  each  T <  t,  sL7+1 is the 
unique  maximizer  of  c,,-,,n,,(-,  s~,,)~p-,,(s-,,~s~),  where  sT <  s’}.  Then,  for 
each  p, 
(i)  C,(s’)  is a compact  convex  set,  and  Ci(s’)  is a convex  set  which 
is open  relative  to  B; 
(ii)  j+(Cp(sl)\C~(sl))  =  m(C,(s’)\Cz(s’))  =  0; 
(iii)  {rD  E B:  (7~p, sf)  E  supp  cp} C  C,(s’);  and 
(iv)  ds’)  =  p~(Cds’))  X  .  .  .  X ~,(c,(s’)). 
Proof.  Assertion  (i) follows  immediately  from  the  definitions  of  C,,(sl) 
and  CE(s’).  To  prove  (ii),  note  that  rn({mp  E B:  for  some  r  <  t and  some 
s, #  sI, E S,,  Xs;p[~&,  , s-,,)  -  ~TJs~, S-J]  cp-&lsT)  = O}) = 0,  because 
this  event  is a fimte  union  of  linear  subspaces  of  B.  Then  (ii)  follows  from 
the  assumption  that  pLp +  m.  Assertion  (iii)  follows  iteratively  from  the 
property  2.4  (ii)  of  the  BSP cp. To  prove  (iv),  note  that  (iii)  implies  that  for 
each  1 5  p  5  n, 
c;w  f-l {“p  : (rp  7 s “)  E  supp  (o} =  0 
for  every  s”  such  that  s$#  s;~ for  some  T 5  t.  Since  the  marginal  distribu- 
tion  of  cp on  G  agrees  with  p,  this  implies  that  fI~=,~,,(Cj(s’))  5  cp(s’). 
Since  (iii)  also  implies  that  cp(s’) 5  fl~=r~,,(C,(s’)),  (iv)  now  follows  from 
(ii).  H 
3.7.  Remarks.  The  proof  of  Proposition  3.6  does  not  use the  indepen- 
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direct  implication  of  3.6  (iv),  it  is apparent  that  if  pp  +  m for  each  p,  then 
2.4  (iii)  follows  from  2.4  (i) and  (ii).  Moreover,  3.6  (iv)  implies  that,  condi- 
tional  on  each  s’ E  supp  cp, the  variables  (mp,  +‘+,)  and  (7rTTq,  So’+,) are 
independent  for  p  #  q.  Thus  3.6  (iv)  is  a slightly  stronger  independence 
condition  than  2.4  (iii). 
Each  set  C,(s’)  is the  intersection  of  B and  finitely  many  closed  half- 
spaces:  one  half-space  for  each  revealed  preference  for  sPT+  , over  sp given 
‘p-p(.l~T),  for  each  T  <  t.  If  we  define  C,(s’,  sp)  =  {TV E  C,(s’):  s,  is 
expected  payoff  maximizing  against  ‘p-J*[s’)},  then  3.6  (iv)  implies  that 
(Pp(spls’) =  Pp(Cp( s’,  ~~))l~~(C’~(s’)).  As  n’,  varies  over  the  set  C&j),  the 
expected  utility  differences 
for  various  strategies  s,’ , s;  E S, , are  related  to  the  relative  diameters  of 
the  sets  CJs’,  sJ.  If  p’,  -  m for  each  p,  the  relative  diameters  are  related 
to  the  relative  p,-probabilities,  and  thus  to  the  conditional  probabilities 
(dp(s#).  The  proof  of  Theorem  3.8  uses this  relation  to  show  that  if  m’, E 
C&j)  for  all  t and  s;  is an  asymptotically  inferior  strategy  for  v’,  against 
cp-,(*I.#),  then  (pp(splsf) -+  0. 
3.8.  THEOREM.  Suppose  that  pp  -  m for  each  p,  and  let  p  be  a BSP 
for  (u. Then  for  every  ((7r’Jp, sz)  E supp  cp, lim,+&(*ls’)  -  ~((7r,),)ll  = 0. 
Proof.  Let  ((mJp,  sz) E  supp  ~7. Since  the  set  of  probability  distribu- 
tion  on  S is compact,  it  suffices  to  show  that  every  cluster  point  of  the 
sequence  {cp(*js’)}Er  lies in N((7r’,),).  Let  (+  be a cluster  point,  so that  there 
is an increasing  sequence  {s’x};,,  with  ~‘k <  sr for  each  k and  cp(*ls’k)  +  U. 
Since  (o is a BSP,  2.4  (iii)  implies  that  cr is a product  distribution.  Fix  q, 
and  for  each  k,  define 
dk  =  max 1  c  7rTTy(sy,  s-,)cp-,(s-,ls’k)  : sy E  S, 
s ”  I 
-min  i C  7~&,  s-y)(p~y(s~yls’~) : (T&J  >  0  .  I  (9) 
s y 
To  prove  that  uy  is a  Nash  equilibrium  mixed  strategy  for  player  q  with 
payoff  function  7ry,  it  suffices  to  show  that  d/, +  0.  Therefore,  we  can 
assume  that  dk > 0 for  all k. Proposition  3.6 (iii)  implies  that  the  maximum 
on  the  right-hand  side  of  (9)  is  achieved  at  sy =  s$;!,  . Taking  a  subse- 
quence  if necessary,  we  can  assume  that  this  is the  same  strategy,  say si, 
for  all k.  We  can  also  assume  that  the  minimum  is achieved  at  the  same 
strategy,  say  s;  , for  all  k.  To  further  condense  notation,  for  each  k and 
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dk  =  c h@,f,  S-q)  - Try&  s-,)]x&,),  SL”  (10) 
and  sq+  = s$;i,  for  all k.  For  each  k,  define  the  linear  function  & : RS -+ R 
by 
s&-J  =  2  [n-&J  ) S-J  -  ?T&,  s-,)]x&,).  (I I) 
\ -0 
In  particular,  &(ry)  =  dk.  For  each  k,  define 
A:  =  {?i-; E  c,(S’k)  : &(&,)  >  o};  (12) 
A:  =  {T:,  E  C,(s’k)  : ti,(,$  =  o};  (13) 
and 
Ak  =  {?T; E  C,(S’k):  &(.rr;)  <  o};  (14) 
It  follows  from  Proposition  3.6  (ii)  and  (iv)  that  (p&&s’~)  =  CL&~;  E 
c&s’)  : s;  is the  unique  maximizer  of  ~:s-qz-~(‘,  s-,)Xk(s~,)}/~,(C,(slk)),  so 
(14)  and  (11)  imply 
Therefore  1 -  cp&&r’k)  Z- ~y(A~)l&C,(s’k))  and 
(1  -  (p,(s,ls’k))/(p,(s,ls’k)  2  P&G~,(AII)~  (16) 
Since  ‘p&;ls  )  ‘k  +  (T&J)  >  0,  we  can  assume  that  the  denominators  in 
(16)  are  positive  for  all k.  For  each  k,  define 
(17) 
so S,  <  0.  Also,  define 
K:  =  {hml,  +  (1  -  h)n,  : 0  I  A <  1 and  7~:, E A!};  (18) 
and 
Kk  =  {A,:  +  (1  -  A)rCTy:  0  5  A 5  1 +  (lSij/dL)  and  ni  E A:}.  (19) 
Then  by  the  definitions  (12),  (13),  and  (18),  K;  c  AZ  . Also,  for  any  ri  E 
Ai,  Mm;)  < 0,  so, using  (17),  yr,  + (1 -  -y>r,!,  E A:  for  some  0 < y 5  16$ 
(Is,J  -  dk),  which  implies  that  rr;  E  Kl,.  Hence  A;  c  KL\K:,  so BAYESIAN  LEARNING  77 
Let  1 =  #S,  let  m”  denote  Lebesgue  measure  on  the  (I  -  I)-dimensional 
linear  subspace  {T;  E RS : &(T$  = 0},  and  let  ak = max{&(T$  : 11~;11  =  l}. 
Then  we  have  the  following  volume  measurements: 
m(&$)  =  dkmO(Af)lf  ak;  (21) 
and 
m(&)  =  [(dx  +  IG;J)‘ld:-‘lm”(A!)lI  ak,  (22) 
SO 
m(K:)h(&%:)  =  d:l[(dk  +  I&l)  -  d:].  (23) 
We  now  show  that  &  +  0.  For  each  k,  S:  = s$:J,,  so Proposition  3.6 
(iii)  implies  that  c,(s’k+r)  C  Al  U  A!.  Hence 
S,,  2  min{&+t(?ri)  : 7rt  E I3  and  &(nh)  2  O}.  (24) 
Since  xk(‘)  *  Um4,  it  follows  from  the  definition  of  Sk,  (1 l),  that 
max{16k+I(mh)  -  i!&(‘rrh)l: QT~  E B} +  0.  Then  (24)  implies  that  SC -+  0. 
Since  py  -  m,  by  (23) and  Definition  3.4,  there  is some  CY  > 0 such  that 
,.&,(K;)/&(&\K:)  2  d:/[(dk  +  Is,l)’  -  d:]a?  (25) 
It  follows  from  (16),  (20),  and  (25)  that 
(1  -  a,(s;))/a,(s;)  2  lim  sup  d:/[(dk  +  f&l)’  -  d&x2. 
k--x  (26) 
Since  Sk +  0,  (26)  implies  that  dk -+  0.  Since  pP -  m  for  all p,  the  above 
argument  shows  that  c  is a Nash  equilibrium  for  (‘TTJ~.  n 
3.9.  Remarks.  If  pLp  -  m for  each  p,  then  supp  p  = G,  so every  normal 
form  game  has  Nash  equilibria  which  are  achieved  as  cluster  points  of 
q(*ls’).  The  following  corollary  is an  equivalent  statement  of  the  theorem 
which  emphasizes  this  implication. 
3.10.  COROLLARY.  Suppose  that  t..~, -  m for  each  p,  and  let  cp be  a 
BSPfor  p.  For  each  (T,),  E G, dejine  L((nJ,,  , cp)  to  be the  set of probabil- 
ity  distributions  u  on  S such  that  there  is an  increasing  sequence  {sfk}~=, 
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(i)  ((r&,,  s’x.) E  supp  cp  for  all  k;  and 
(ii)  limk+,,  cp(*ls’k) =  ff. 
Then  for  every  (.n&  E  G,  L((7rp),,  cp) is a  nonempty  subset  ofN((~,),). 
3.11.  EXAMPLE.  The  assumption  that  pLp -  m  for  each  p,  or  some 
very  similar  assumption,  seems  essential  to  the  above  result.  This  section 
provides  an  example  showing  that  in  the  absence  of  such  an  assumption, 
there  can  be  points  ((v,,&,  s-)  E  supp  cp with  subsequences  of  expecta- 
tions  {~(*I.+~)}%’  converging  to  some  o  @ N((5-J,). 
The  example  will  involve  two  players  and  three  pure  strategies  for  each 
player.  We first  specify  a probability  distribution,  p”  on  the  unit  square  [0, 
I]  x  [O,  11, which  will  be  used  to  define  pl.  Points  in  the  unit  square  will 
be  denoted  (x,  y).  The  essential  properties  of  p”  are  that 
/.L”(x I  3) =  .tj,  /.~‘(y  4  $ -  fix  >  $) =  .6;  (27) 
and  for  each  integer  r  >  2, 
p”(x  5  I  -  (Y +  I))+  >  I  -  c’,  y  >  (B) -  c’)  =  .6;  (28) 
and 
p”(y  5  (f)  -  (r  +  I)-‘lx  >  I  -  (r  +  1))‘,  y  >  (&) -  F’)  =  .6.  (29) 
Also,  p”  is absolutely  continuous  with  respect  to  Lebesgue  measure,  and 
the  density  function,f,  is strictly  positive  on  (0,  1)  x  (0,  I),  so that  supp  p” 
=  [0,  l]  x  [0,  I].  Such  a p”  can  be  constructed  iteratively,  making  the 
density  function  constant  at the  appropriate  positive  level  on  rectangles  of 
the  form  (1  -  r-‘,  1 -  (v +  I)-‘]  x  ((4) -  Y-I,  11, and  (1  -  (Y +  l))‘,  I]  x 
((4) -  r-‘,  (4) -  (r  +  l))‘].  Then  the  density  functionfis  bounded  above, 
but  for  any  (4)  5  y  5  1, f(.r,,,  y)  +Oasx,,+  1,sofdoesnothavea 
positive  lower  bound. 
Now  let  S,  =  S2 =  {a,  b,  c}.  The  specification  of  ,ul  and  ,u~ will  be 
simplified  by  departing  from  the  unit  ball  normalization  of  payoff  func- 
tions.  Let  p2  be  the  point  mass  at  $j  defined  by 
0  if  sl #  .s?; 
?T:(S’, s2) =  %  ifs’  =  s2 =  a  or  s’  =  s2 =  6;  and  (30) 
I  ifs’  =  s2 =  c. 
The  distribution  pl  is defined  by  the  properties  that,  with  probability  one, BAYESIAN  LEARNING  79 
0  ifs,  #  s2; and 
~I(SI  7  s2)  =  (31) 
1  ifs,  =  s2 =  c; 
and  the  joint  distribution  on  (~,(a,  a),  zr,(b,  b))  is given  by  PO. Thus,  each 
(7~,,  nTT2)  E  supp  p  defines  a  “battle-of-the-sexes”  game  with  three  pure 
strategies. 
There  is a multiplicity  of  Bayesian  strategy  processes  for  CL,  and  we  will 
exploit  this  multiplicity  in  the  following  construction  of  cp. In  odd  num- 
bered  periods  cp,(*ls’) will  be  a mixture  of  strategies  a and  c,  and  in  even 
numbered  periods  cp,(.(s’) will  be  a mixture  of  h and  c.  More  specifically, 
in  period  1, let 
cp,(s, =  a)  =  .4,  cp,(s, =  c)  =  .6,  ‘p2(s2 =  a)  =  .6,  (p&2  =  c)  =  .4.  (32) 
Then  (27)  and  (30)  ensure  that  (32)  is consistent  with  first-period  Bayesian 
Nash  equilibrium.  We  will  be  concerned  with  the  strategy  sequence  gen- 
erated  by  the  game  (my,  &)  E supp  p  defined  by ~:‘(a,  m) =  I  and  n’l(h,  h) 
=  I  (or  (x,  y)  =  (I,  I)  in the  definition  of  PO, above).  For  this  TTT:),  we  have, 
in  the  first  period,  sI,  =  u,  which  reveals  to  player  2  that  ~,(a,  a)  >  f. 
Since  p2  is  a point  mass  at  rrp,  player  1 has  nothing  more  to  learn  from 
observing  s2 in  any  period.  In  period  2,  let 
cp,(Sl =  bls,,  =  a)  =  .4,  cpds,  =  cls,,  =  a)  =  .6, 
cpz(s2  =  bls,,  =  a)  =  q,  (p2(s, =  cls,,  =  a)  =  3.  (33) 
Then  (27)  and  (30) ensure  that  (33) is consistent  with  second-period  Bay- 
esian  equilibrium.  Since  rrz(b,  b)  =  1, we  have  s12 = b.  In  general,  let s’ be 
any  history  satisfying  s17 = a if r is odd  and  slT = b if r  is even,  for  each  r 5 
t.  If  t  is even,  let  r  =  2  +  (t/2),  and  let 
p,(s,  =  uls’)  =  .4,  cp,(s, =  (‘Is’)  =  .6 
‘p2(s2 =  uls’)  =  (r  +  1)/(2r  +  l),  ‘p&  =  c/s’)  =  rl(2r  +  1).  (34) 
If  t is odd,  let  r  =  2  +  (t  -  1)/2,  and  let 
cp,(s,  =  bid)  =  .4,  cp,(s, =  cIs’)  =  .6 
(pz(s2  =  bls’)  =  (2r  +  2)/(3r  +  I),  (b&  =  c/s’)  =  (r  -  1)/(3r  +  1). 
(35) 
Then  (30),  together  with  (28)  (resp.  (29)),  ensures  that  (34)  (resp.  (35))  is 
consistent  with  Bayesian  Nash  equilibrium.  Also,  since  ~!(a,  a)  =  1 and 80  J.  S.JORDAN 
7$(b,  b)  =  1,  (34)  implies  that  So,+, =  a  when  t  is even,  and  (35)  implies 
that  Q+I  =  b  when  t  is odd. 
Finally,  for  each  positive  integer  k,  let  tk  =  2k  -  1. Then  for  each  k, 
((r?,  &  ~‘k) E  supp  cp, and  ~(.]s’~)  +  v  =  uI  x  u?,  where 
u,(s,  =  b)  =  .4,  cp,(s, =  c)  =  .6, 
u2(s2  =  b)  =  3,  ‘pz(s* =  c)  =  i. 
However,  since  my(b,  b)  = QT~(C,  c) =  1 and  ry(b,  c)  = ~T?(c, b)  = 0,  c1  is 
not  a Nash  equilibrium  mixed  strategy  for  player  1. 
The  fact  that  p”  is  absolutely  continuous  with  respect  to  Lebesgue 
measure  on  [0,  I]  x  [O,  I]  suggests  that  a more  elaborate  version  of  this 
example  may  be  possible  with  pp  e  m  for  each  p.  It  appears  that  the 
relation  between  relative  volumes  and  probabilities,  which  yields  the  in- 
equality  (25) in  the  proof  of  Theorem  3.8,  may  be  essential  for  the  general 
convergence  result. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
The  main  result  of  this  paper  is stated  as Corollary  3.10,  above.  Given 
any  fixed  finite  set  of  players  and  pure  strategies,  if  the  prior  probability 
distribution  over  payoff  functions  is sufficiently  uniform,  then  a Bayesian 
strategy  process  is a learning  process  which  achieves  Nash  equilibria  for 
every  normal  form  game.  In  particular,  a single  BSP cp completely  speci- 
fies a learning  process  for  all normal  form  games  with  the  given  player  and 
strategy  sets. 
Perhaps  the  most  troubling  feature  of  Bayesian  strategy  processes  is the 
amount  of  required  coordination  among  the  players.  A  common  prior 
distribution  p  must  be  agreed  upon,  and  selections  among  multiple  Bay- 
esian  Nash  equilibria  must  be agreed  upon  at  each  stage  of  process.  All  of 
these  choices  are  built  into  the  single  object  cp, so they  are  independent  of 
particular  realizations  of  the  game  (nJp.  In  this  sense,  the  coordination 
embodied  in  (a is  similar  to  the  requirement  in  macroeconomic  learning 
models,  for  example,  that  all agents  use  a particular  econometric  proce- 
dure  (e.g.,  Marcet  and  Sargent,  1989).  However,  the  amount  of  coordina- 
tion  embodied  in  cp is intuitively  much  greater.  It  would  be  interesting  to 
formulate  a measure  of  such  coordination  and  to  determine  the  minimal 
coordination  required  for  general  convergence. 
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